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ABSTRACT. In times of transition and transformation, legal images metastasize. This idea can 
be usefully related both to Winnicott’s theory of transitional objects and Barthes’ theory of 
myth. But each tell only part of the full story. Barthes fails to fully account for the stabilizing 
effect of the reassuring signifier; Winnicott fails to fully account for the ideological adaptability 
– and implications – of the shifting signified. The legal image unites the iterability of the 
signifier and the polysemy of the signified, harnessing the affective intensity of the former to 
the cultural mobility of the latter. In this article, I propose to illustrate this insight by reflecting 
on two notable images of law that appeared at a moment of profound legal transformation, at 
the dawn of the early modern era. The images of ‘blind justice’ and ‘sol justiciae’ which the 
article discusses are both ‘transitional myths’, facilitating through modes of affect a legal 
journey into uncharted territory. Paying attention to these images and above all to their 
  
 
transformation over time, we can observe not only the process of legal transition at work, but 
the function of the image in its authorization and modalization. 
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I. MYTH, IMAGE, AND TRANSITIONAL PHENOMENA 
In times of transition and transformation, legal images metastasize. This process, 
simultaneously one of movement and sameness, may properly be analyzed under the rubric of 
myth, but illustrates an important aspect which Roland Barthes, in his classic work on the 
subject, ignores. Myth, says Barthes, is a kind of meta-language. It takes the raw material of a 
sign – a combination of signifier and signified – and strips it of memory, knowledge, and 
history (Barthes 1957, pp. 115-7). Now denuded of particularity, the sign is transformed into 
an essence of some kind and combined with a new signified. It becomes ‘frozen speech’ – ‘it 
stiffens, it makes itself look neutral and innocent’ (p. 125). One well-known example, drawn 
from the cover of Life Magazine, shows a black soldier saluting the French flag during the 
Algerian war. The soldier and his blackness, divorced from their history and context, are 
drafted into the service of an ideological signified: the essence of ‘nationhood’. 
This is a kind of arrest, in both the physical and the legal sense of the term: French imperiality condemns the 
saluting Negro to be nothing more than an instrumental signifier, the Negro suddenly hails me in the name of 
French imperiality; but at the same moment the Negro’s salute thickens, becomes vitrified, freezes into an eternal 
reference meant to establish French imperiality… This is because myth is speech stolen and restored. Only, speech 
which is restored is no longer quite that which was stolen: when it was brought back, it was not put exactly in its 
place. It is this brief act of larceny. (p. 125) 
For Barthes, the operation of myth is insidious because it is ideological, and ideological 
because it strips politics from speech. It transforms historical intention into a natural 
  
 
justification, ‘making contingency appear eternal’ and reducing human decisions to ‘the 
simplicity of essences’ (p. 142). Myth therefore is the status quo’s greatest weapon, and the 
enemy of all social change. ‘For the very end of myths is to immobilize the world: they must 
suggest and mimic a universal order which has fixed once and for all the hierarchy of 
possessions’ (p. 155). 
This is true, but only as far as it goes. The proposition that myth, at least in the modern 
West, benumbs critique, essentializing social inequality and tranquilizing social resistance, is 
persuasive. Myth speaks in the voice of eternity; it presents injustice as natural, as inevitable, 
as nothing more than how things are. But in some ways Barthes takes mythic language too 
much at face value. He treats it not just as a gesture of stability but as a force of stability. In 
the process he entirely misses one of the most vital characteristics of mythic speech and the 
images that animate them: their ability, precisely by invoking the rhetoric of eternity and 
essence, to surreptitiously advance the most dramatic of social changes. The end of myth, 
particularly in its more ideological manifestations, is emphatically not to ‘immobilize the 
world’; only to appear to do so. 
Barthes’ failure to appreciate the ways in which myth is capable of facilitating social 
change by dressing it up in the frock of eternity, makes his structural analysis one-sided. He 
insists throughout ‘Myth Today’ that what is plastic is the signifier – the word or the sign or 
the image. By implication, the signified, that is myth’s ideological content or meaning, remains 
unchanged. He focuses on the ways in which ‘the smallest myth-signifier can generate the 
richest conceptual mythic structure’ (p. 120). The relative emptiness of the signifier and the 
relative stability of the signified, he thinks, allows multiple signifiers to stand in for the same 
signifieds. Claude Levi-Strauss (e.g. 1979) starts from the same assumption. He too looks for 
an underlying coherence of signification beneath the superficial diversity of mythic signifiers 
– musical and architectural structures, stories, animal figures, topographic features, narratives, 
  
 
and so on. The search for constant signifieds beneath mobile signifiers is a pretty succinct 
characterization of structuralism. 
But the opposite can equally be the case. Sometimes myth employs a stable signifier 
precisely so as to conceal a radical change in signification. The citation of signifiers – signs or 
images – conceals a transformation in meaning. We are dealing now with the historical 
movement of a myth over time. The image metastasizes. At any one moment we can say that 
its goal is to ‘immobilize the world’. But over time the illusion of stasis is a strategy that works, 
on a meta-level, to legitimate certain social transformations. Barthes outlined an algebra of 
myth; its calculus, that is the study of how it changes over time, produces different results. Far 
from the plasticity of the signifier and the constancy of the signified, what emerges is the 
constancy of the signifier and the plasticity of the signified. The search for mobile signifieds 
beneath constant and iterable signifiers is a pretty succinct characterization of post-
structuralism. 
In political terms, likewise, Barthes treats ‘the right’ as a group that holds power in 
order to protect its economic and social control. In other words he sees its interests as always 
conservative. The language of myth and the forces of conservatism form a natural alliance 
because both strive to prevent social consciousness and sabotage social change. But a 
moment’s thought will reveal that this is far too simplistic. In the past twenty years, for 
example, ‘the right’ has advanced a brutal agenda of social and economic change. Call it 
‘globalization’ or ‘neo-liberalism’. This political constellation has not been passive or 
conservative at all. Right-wing politics today still evokes mythologies of stability, nature, and 
essence. But this is not because it is opposed to social change, but in an effort to disguise it. 
There is no more iconic symbol of constitutional traditionalism in the US, for example, than 
the ‘right to bear arms’; yet the interpretation of the Second Amendment is now exactly the 
  
 
opposite of its interpretation at any time in the first 200 years of its existence.1 The rhetoric of 
myth is a ‘distortion’ of history, a ‘conjuring trick’ of de-politicization; but here it works to 
actively engage in social change. The conservatism of conservatism is just another myth. 
Neither is this an historical anomaly. At critical junctures throughout our legal and 
economic history, forces of inequality have been radical agents of change, despite the fact that 
they have tended to fight under the banner of mythic figures – nation, nature, tradition, empire, 
God, and so on. The industrial revolution, for example, and before that the emergence of the 
modern State, absolutist monarchies, legal and religious Reformation, and so on, were all 
accompanied by dramatic changes in legal, social, and economic forms. In these struggles, 
mythic representations actively facilitated certain kinds of change under the guise of 
maintaining essences, traditions, and natures.  
Take the image of Queen Elizabeth.2 Her status as the Virgin Queen was, of course, a 
mythical rather than a biological statement. In painting after painting, she is depicted as ageless, 
white-faced, immobile. References to the Queen as a vestal virgin – holding a sieve to echo the 
story of Tuccia, or as the just virgin Astraea (Yates 1975) – are insistent and powerful. In the 
Ditchley Portrait (Gheeraerts 1592) and others,3 she strides the world like a colossus, the 
embodiment of her imperial ambitions. She is shown capable of commanding not just map and 
globe, territory and power. She is sovereign over light and dark itself, like God on the first day 
of Creation. Yet at the same time she is holding a fan and gloves, representing and insisting on 
her femininity. The Rainbow Portrait (Oliver 1600-02) likewise builds on this complex political 
1 See for example Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary 1982; Levinson 1989; 
District of Columbia v. Heller 2008.  
2 See in particular Strong 1969, 1977, 1987. 
3 Other examples include George Gower, Plimpton Sieve Portrait, 1579; Metsys the Younger, Siena Sieve 
Portrait, 1583; Armada Portrait, c. 1588; Crispijn van de Passe, 1596.  
                                                          
  
 
symbolism. But while political analyses of the cult of Elizabeth emphasize her virginity as an 
oath of fealty to her kingdom, that no man may mar her rule nor limit her sovereignty, the 
affective dimensions of this symbolism have been less often observed. There had been a 
uniquely powerful cult of the Virgin Mary in Anglo-Saxon England (Clayton 2003). It 
continued to exert an overwhelming influence right up until the Reformation when, ‘in the 
rampant iconoclasm of the English Reformation, the cult of the Virgin Mary was decisively 
fractured’ (Espinosa 2011, p. 1; see also Maunder 2008). The figure of Mary occupied a 
complex range of roles in pre-Reformation Catholicism, but central to them all was the 
emotional connection she afforded worshippers through the figure of her cherished 
motherhood. Her role of intercessor was founded on her position as mediator between god and 
humankind. From the thirteenth century on she became a pivotal figure inspiring deep devotion 
and love (Kristeva and Goldhammer 1985), and generating shrines and sites of pilgrimage, 
festivals, and untold poems and plays. Indeed, Barry Spurr describes Mariolatry as ‘the most 
pervasive expression of Catholic Christianity in England’ (2007, p. 1); its suppression the most 
conspicuous feature of the English Reformation. For Protestantism, Marian idolatry was 
anathema precisely because it was rooted in extra-textual traditions and the affective and 
aesthetic dimensions of belief. It was the epitome of the feminization and aesthetic decadence 
of Catholicism. Its destruction was a critical feature of the reformers’ ‘masculinization of piety’ 
(Espinosa 2011, pp. 22-25). 
Scholars dispute the relationship between the two virgins in sixteenth-century England. 
This disagreement hinges on whether or not Elizabeth was really ‘a compensation for the 
psychological trauma of losing the Virgin as an object of worship’ or rather ‘a figurehead of 
militant nationalistic Protestantism’ (Espinosa 2011, pp. 27-8). On the latter view what matters 
is how the virgin became a figure of sovereignty rather than how the sovereign became a figure 
of virginity. But the idea of the image as a transitional myth demonstrates that both sides of 
  
 
this argument are right, and both are necessary. The cult of Elizabeth was not simply a 
replacement of like for like. Elizabeth the Virgin Queen thoroughly inverted the meaning of 
the Virgin Mary, imbuing it with a wholly new set of signifieds conformable to Protestant, 
nationalist, and imperialist, ideology. But she successfully accomplishes this transition 
precisely because she is able to appropriate the existing signifier and exploit popular emotional 
ties to it. As a sublimated form of the Virgin Mary, Elizabeth facilitates the transference of an 
emotional fealty from the figure of the holy mother to the figure of the mother of the nation 
(Strong 1977, 1987; Yates 1975). Her portraits were particularly potent in a semiotic tradition 
still governed, at least unconsciously, by the logic of the Eucharist, which construed certain 
sacred objects not as mere representations of Christ but as filled with his actual presence. If 
Elizabeth became ‘the portrait of the queen’, to borrow Louis Marin’s phrase (1988), it is 
because her image was Janus-faced, uniquely positioned simultaneously to recall, and to 
reinvest with new meanings, the trope of virginity.  
Contrary to Barthes’ emphasis on its multiplicity, the continuity of the signifier can be 
seen to be of utmost importance to this and other processes of ideological transubstantiation. 
The argument has something in common with the work of D.W. Winnicott, who introduced 
and pioneered the study of ‘transitional objects’ (1953, 1971).4 As many other writers have 
since drawn out, the phrase ‘security blanket’ is singularly appropriate. Transitional 
phenomena allow the child to cope with change, in the first instance by becoming 
accommodated to the temporary loss of their mother, for example when going to sleep or in a 
novel environment. The signifier stimulates a memory of presence that compensates for an 
experience of absence (Winnicott 2011, pp. 101-5). The child’s relationship to some special 
symbolic object – a blanket or teddy bear, a familiar tune or poem – thus alleviates their anxiety 
4 For further discussion, see also Busch 1974; Winnicott 2011, chapter 5, pp. 99-125 (containing the slightly 
revised 1971 version of the original 1951 paper); Winnicott 1971, ch. 1.  
                                                          
  
 
(Passman 1987; Coppolillo 1977; Wallendorf and Arnould 1988). Its repetitive availability, its 
capacity for immediate citation, comforts the child. As Winnicott (2011, p. 115) is at pains to 
point out, it is not in fact the object which is in transition but the user of it. The transitional 
object, like Piaget’s ‘assimilative schema’, is a ‘bridge’ that enables the child to understand 
and respond to a changing external world. In this way it should be distinguished from a fetish, 
whose obsessive and repetitive character is a purely defensive posture against the onset of 
anxiety (Deri 1978, pp. 52-3; Dickes 1978, pp. 307-19). The transitional object, in contrast, is 
creative and enabling. 
The possibility of applying the notion of transitional phenomena to the broader field of 
culture, has not gone unremarked (e.g. Modell 1970; Rudnytsky 1993). Winnicott and his 
followers recognized the role of aesthetics in the constitution of the world more persuasively 
than Freud. Winnicott (2011, p. 115) had already observed: 
This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) reality, 
constitutes the greater part of the infant’s experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing 
that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work. 
We can begin to see that the idea of transitional objects captures a broad swathe of human 
practices of meaning-making. If the teddy bear is ‘the first not-me possession’ (Winnicott 1953, 
1971), then burial rituals are the last. These too, in very many cultures, serve to relieve 
separation anxiety by incorporating treasured objects to comfort us as we embark on a deeply 
mysterious journey into an intransigent external reality (Grolnik 1978, p. 381).  
Myth is, on a much grander scale, something like the ‘security blanket’ of a culture, a 
collection of images and scenes that simultaneously accommodate the individual to social 
structures, and invite their participation in them (Manderson 2003). The portrait of the queen 
can be understood in these terms. Elizabeth’s reified and familiar effigy alleviated the pain 
caused by the absent mother of god. Her image was a security blanket, a reassurance against 
  
 
anxiety, but it was not a fetish. Under her eyes, new constellations of meaning were gaining 
traction, infusing the emotional satisfaction of the past with new meaning, combining the form 
of the old with the substance of the new. Thus the image of Elizabeth appropriated a familiar 
figure of devotion – essential, natural, irresistible – and propelled it along new paths. What 
impresses one is not that ideology ‘immobilize[s] the world’, but on the contrary that it 
mobilizes it so effectively, while giving the opposite impression. That is the role played by 
law’s transitional objects. 
Yet Barthes’ discussion of ‘myth today’ offers a much less sanguine analysis of cultural 
symbols. Whereas Winnicott and his followers see security as a functional adaptation to the 
‘external world’, Barthes sees instead a sickening complacency. That is the difference, perhaps, 
between psychology and sociology. For Barthes, the comforts of myth are overwhelmingly a 
‘distortion’, ‘a trick’, ‘robbery’, or ‘larceny’. So Winnicott’s theory of transitional objects 
suffers from the obverse limitation to Barthes’ theory of myth. Barthes fails to fully account 
for the stabilizing effect of the reassuring signifier; Winnicott fails to fully account for the 
ideological adaptability – and implications – of the shifting signified. The legal image unites 
the iterability of the signifier and the polysemy of the signified, harnessing the affective 
intensity of the former to the cultural mobility of the latter. In the sections that follow, I propose 
to illustrate the importance of this insight by reflecting on two notable images of law that 
appeared at a moment of profound legal transformation, at the dawn of the early modern era. 
Both were ‘transitional myths’, facilitating through modes of affect a legal journey into 
uncharted territory. Paying attention to these images and above all to their transformation over 
time, we can observe not only the process of legal transition at work, but the function of the 





II. BLIND JUSTICE 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1: Fool Blindfolding Justice, in Sebastian Brant, Das Narrenschiff (woodcut, 1494)
  
© Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. Permission to 
reproduce gratefully acknowledged. 
 
The figure of blind justice is a relative newcomer to the iconography of Western law.5 In 1494, 
the noted jurist Sebastian Brant published a collection of satirical poems called Das 
Narrenschif or The Ship of Fools, and commissioned several artists to illustrate it with a series 
of woodcuts (Brant 1494, 1944, 1971). Verse 71 is a crude satire, excoriating the corruption 
and cynicism of the legal profession. Brant’s doggerel concludes: 
He’ll get much raillery uncouth, 
Who fights like children tooth for tooth 
And thinks that he can blind the truth. (Gillis 1971, p. 236)6 
But the image, sometimes attributed to Albrecht Dürer (Figure 1; Brant 1944, p. 379; Panofsky 
1995; Brant 1971, pp. xxv-vi), goes further in its critique than does Brant. It portrays not truth 
but justice being manhandled by a fool in a tricorn hat. We can rightly say that the figure of 
5 For other discussions, see Douzinas and Nead 1999; Jay 1999; De Ville 2011; Resnik and Curtis 2011, pp. 62-
90; Goodrich 2014, ch. 1. 
6 An alternative translation: ‘Very often he feels the heckler’s barbs / Who always quarrels like a child / And 
wants to make the truth blind.’ (Leo Unglaub) 
                                                          
  
 
‘blind justice’ was the artist’s own invention. He emphasizes the animus of lawyers, actively 
blindfolding justice, the better to achieve their own foolish ends. Through the open window an 
urban vista can be glimpsed, recalling Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s ‘Allegory and Effects of Good 
Government’, which since 1337 has held pride of place in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena.7 But 
quite contrary to Lorenzetti’s Aristotelian utopia, Brant’s city is empty of humanity, and 
separated from the machinations of the law. The fool prepares justice for her role in some back 
room, like an actor’s dressing room on opening night. 
The appearance of this trope is not surprising. What is astounding is the speed with 
which it lost its satirical edge. The first edition of Césare Ripa’s Iconologia in 1593 notes that 
‘in the opinion of Plato, nothing escapes the eyes of Justice…and by the force of her gaze she 
penetrates to the base of all things’ (1976). Ten years later, the earliest illustrated editions 
represent several aspects of justice, but only one of them – called ‘worldly’ or ‘strict’ justice – 
was depicted blindfolded. But within a very short time, the Madonna bandita had become a 
ubiquitous symbol of abstraction and neutrality, and a generic statement of the judiciary’s 
commitment to maintain a formal ignorance of personal circumstances. Even during the 
sixteenth century, official statues of blind justice – played straight, as it were – start to pop up 
(Resnik and Curtis 2011, pp. 62-75). As the inscription on Tübingen Town Hall explains, ‘My 
eyes are bound so that rich and poor appear the same’ (Resnik and Curtis 2011, pp. 62-75). By 
the early 1600s, something unprecedented seems to have overtaken the legal imaginary. The 
history of the image draws our attention to a complete inversion of established ideas, and 
pinpoints it in time. 
What happened might be summed up in one word – modernity. Modernity came earlier 
to the law than to many other discursive formations. Harold Berman (1983, pp. 151-64) claims 
7 Lorenzetti 1337-39. For further discussions, see Mohr 2011; Skinner 1986, 1999; Rubinstein 1958; Nederman 
1996; Meoni 2005.  
                                                          
  
 
that law was the West’s first real science, and the notion of blindness expressed its commitment 
to empirical neutrality centuries before it entered the language of scientific experiment. 
Ironically, it was the papacy that set it in motion. In 1075, Pope Gregory VII unilaterally 
declared the independence of the church from all secular authority. But at the same time, he 
announced a strikingly positivist set of reforms and arrogated to a structurally independent and 
hierarchical legal structure the authority to create new laws – jus novum (Tierney 1983, pp. 
142-3; Blumenthal 1993).This was a momentous departure from the idea of law as divine, 
eternal, customary, or traditional. The great Norman kings of the twelfth century, Roger of 
Sicily, Frederick Barbarossa, and in England, Henry II, likewise understood monarchical power 
as essentially legislative and centralizing, advanced through a structure of legal regulation 
conceived as autonomous, posited, and written (Berman 1983, pp. 19-22, 80-96, 202-03). Thus 
was introduced the concept of ‘rule by law’, if not the rule of law. Increasingly, a professional 
legal and judicial class was needed to realize it (Berman 1983, pp. 405-57, 440-4). 
The Reception of Roman law, first in the universities and then across the Holy Roman 
Empire, set in train a further process of centralization, textualization, bureaucratization, and 
regulation that left no corner of the realm untouched (Pennington 1993). Roman law expanded 
administrative and regulatory control, and profoundly altered the relationship between 
monarchical authority and justice. Princes began to think of themselves not as the guardians 
of legal principles of justice, but as its authors (Strauss 1986, pp. 150-1). Quite apart from the 
specific powers that might be taken away from local communities and jurisdictions in the name 
of Justinian or the ‘common law of the empire’, many people were troubled by the ineluctable 
rise of the legal profession which went with it. The fifteenth century saw increasing resistance, 
particularly in Germany, to the ‘reformation’ of the imperial civil law at the expense of local 
customary law (Strauss 1986; Vinogradoff 1961, pp. 139-42). Das Narrenschiff was one among 
many diatribes that displayed a deep anxiety concerning the growing power of ‘written’ or 
  
 
‘learned’ lawyers, whose essentially technical facility had made them biddable allies of the 
centralizing State – ‘a guild of sovereignty-mongers’, as Jacob Moser branded them (Strauss 
1986, p. 142). The figure of blind justice appears for the first time only a few months before 
the establishment of the Rechtskammergericht as a central court of legal appeal across the Holy 
Roman Empire. 
The Protestant Reformation was only the final chapter in a broad pattern of social and 
political change, in which the transformation of legal structures and institutions, and a 
corresponding dissociation between human law and divine justice, had sometimes been a 
lightning rod for discontent. Yet despite the Protestant movement’s initial suspicion of 
modernity, its success in Northern Europe ultimately strengthened the hand of the State and 
entrenched the vehicle of written, formal law through which its power was exercised. 
Ironically, Luther’s attack on the cosy relationship between the church and the law turned out 
to be a Trojan horse. 
Where Lutheranism succeeded, the church came to be conceived as invisible, apolitical, a-legal; and the only 
sovereignty, the only law (in the political sense), was that of the secular kingdom… This Lutheran skepticism 
made possible the emergence of a theory of law – legal positivism – which treats the law of the state as morally 
neutral, a means and not an end. (Berman 1983, p. 29) 
As Martin Jay notes (1999, p. 24), images of blind justice first emerge and proliferate 
in the public spaces of northern Europe, where Protestantism bit hardest and where the 
processes of modernization in law and the public sphere were most advanced. Protestantism’s 
distrust of the power of emotion, feeling, and vision, proved to be thoroughly compatible with 
the arid and analytic sensibilities of modern law (Goodrich 1995; Douzinas and Nead 1999). 
Indeed, the notion of justice as blind was ideally placed to affirm Protestantism’s intense fear 
of images (Belting 1997). 
In fact, blind justice most recalls the figure of Synagoga, statues of which stood in many 
medieval churches as a symbol of the Old Testament and Judaism (Jacob 1994). Synagoga, 
  
 
aged and blindfolded, signified Judaism’s stubborn refusal to open its eyes to the revelation of 
the New Testament (pp. 233-37). Synagoga is old where Ecclesia, the Church, is young, 
stooped where she is upright, blind where she sees all, pedantic where she is compassionate, 
law to her equity (Seiferth 1970). But in the years following the Reformation, blind synagogue 
– shorn of its anti-semitic associations – found a second life. As church and state became 
increasingly separate, the abstraction, the textual dogmatism, the downright legalism of 
Synagoga, in earlier times a theological atavism, came instead to constitute a secular value. 
The blindfold articulated a new relationship with the Christian church, now governed neither 
by a logic of progress and reconciliation (Ecclesia’s Gospel completing Synagoga’s Law), nor 
one of opposition and substitution (Gospel replacing Law), but rather of separation– Gospel, 
as Lucas Cranach’s painting (1529) so clearly illustrates, operating in a quite different sphere 
from the Law. The blindfold came to represent not a defect to be cured, but a temptation 
(towards visual sensuality) to be abjured.8 The medieval dinosaur did not become extinct after 
all. It evolved into the modern bird, and flew. 
The myth of blind justice combines elements of the legal reformation that preceded it, 
and of which it was originally critical, with elements of the religious reformation that succeeded 
and substantially modified it. The image can be seen to hold together these two contradictory 
elements, uniting them into a new coherence. It accommodates itself to a profoundly new legal 
environment by incorporating references to the backward-looking critique within a new 
discourse of separation. Myths sublimate underlying tensions, in the strict sense of raising them 
8 Jacob 1994 concludes as follows: ‘Le Moyen Age sentait la justice proche, familière. Il ne la voyait inquiétante 
qu’en ce qu’elle incorporait la proximité du châtiment et du salut, dont chacun devait se pénétrer. L’âge classique 
edifie une justice distante, inspirant la crainte parce qu’elle se veut autre… Le Moyen Age cherchait les 
fondements symboliques de la justice dans l’echange des regards croisés de tousses acteuers, les images leur 
donnant l’impulsion et le relais. L’age classique les éteint au profit d’une justice impénétrable.’ (p. 245) 
                                                          
  
 
to a higher plane, where they endow existing social relations with narrative legitimacy (see 
Levi-Strauss 1979, 1994; Freud 1918). The figure of blind justice is a myth of modern law in 
just this sense. It takes the underlying cultural oppositions that had been central to the contested 
emergence of modern law for centuries – between law and justice, letter and spirit, particular 
and general, local and universal, spiritual and temporal – and finds a new accommodation, 
transforming these dichotomies from the underlying critique of modern law to the condition of 
its authority.  
The blindfold is a classic example of what I have described as a transitional myth – a 
security blanket for the eyes. The image does not just emerge during a critical time of transition, 
but ultimately enables it, representing in the same sign first one set of characteristics and then 
the opposite. In fact the same signifier undergoes not one but two declensions As Synagoga, 
the blindfold initially signified a legal fetish, unjust and repetitive. As Brant’s fool, it translated 
a familiar religious critique into a secularizing context. Finally, under the complex influence 
of the Reformation, the blindfold came to celebrate the very separation it had initially 
condemned. The constancy of the signifier masked the fluidity of the signified. Stripped of its 
context and memory, the myth of the Madonna bandita proved infinitely pliable. By presenting 





III. SOL JUSTICIAE 




Figure 1: Albrecht Dürer, Sol Justitiae (etching, 1500) 
© The Trustees of the British Museum. Permission to reproduce gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
Whether or not Brant’s fool was drawn by Dürer, as Erwin Panofksy (1948) argued, it was a 
relatively crude foray into legal imagery. His Sol Justiciae (Figure 2; 1500) is far more richly 
suggestive and aesthetically rewarding, and displays many of the strengths that has made Dürer 
such an epochal figure in Western art. The peculiar posture of the figure, seated and with legs 
crossed, his gaze directed down and away, is in fact a common posture to signify judgment 
(Parallax 2008, pp. 51-2); the requirement that judges deliver their verdicts while seated goes 
back to Roman times. So Sol Justiciae is not an abstract ideal of justice, but a figure caught in 
the act of judgment. It provides a dazzling late synthesis of the whole pre-modern legal tradition 
that was then in decline, represented here through tropes of light and sun that prefigure a divine 
and transcendent visibility. Dürer’s sol unites Christ and Apollo in the one persona (Panofksy 
1943). This fusion had been sanctioned as early as the third century, the sun’s cosmological 
centrality in the ancient world, transformed into a moral significance (pp. 259-60). Christ and 
Apollo, sun, god, and judge, are completed united in Dürer’s portrayal. The lion indicates the 
summer solstice by reference to the zodiacal sign of Leo, while the circlet around the head 
combines Christ’s halo and Apollo’s corona.9 The blazing fire that emanates from him emits a 
merciless light that exposes the truth. It illuminates, sears, and burns. But his gaze is profoundly 
melancholy. In the Stanza della Signatura in the Vatican apartments, Raphael’s ‘Justice’ (1511) 
holds a similar pose. She too is seated in judgment, eyes looking down and away, sword held 
high in her right hand, scales low in her left. But her mood is contemplative, other-worldly. 
9 See also Durer’s image of Apollo1502; and of Resurrection 1497. 
                                                          
  
 
Here, the sun of justice is wide-eyed and haunted. In the familiar language of the Bible, ‘And 
said to the judges, Take heed what ye do: for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord, who is 
with you in the judgment’ (II Chronicles 19:6). The judge’s principal obligation is not to the 
king or the law but to God, whose justice he does and to whose judgment he must eventually 
subject himself. To give each their due is not a pleasure but a duty. The message Dürer conveys 
is of judgment as a burden, perhaps even as a curse. The lion, with all its coiled power, looks 
straight at us, but the sun of justice averts his gaze in sadness or disappointment. Dürer’s Sol 
Justiciae discloses the intimate and affective bond between the act of judgment and the weight 
of justice, between the judge’s earthly office and his accountability to the divine. It 
encapsulates centuries of iconography just as The Ship of Fools ushers in, albeit unwittingly, a 
radically opposed modern image – the former wide-eyed, emotional, all-seeing; the latter blind, 
clinical, unfeeling.  
Under the pressures of legal modernity noted above, the trope of divine light, together 
with its emotional power and its cosmic resonances, did not disappear (see Goodrich 2014; 
Stolleis 2004). It too metastasized, the same signifier eliding a radical transformation. The eye 
of God, as Michael Stolleis puts it (2004, p. 36), ‘migrated to the prince as the secular governor 
of God. His “omniscience”, as fictitious as it was, became the crucial basis of legitimation of 
the just content of laws’. The sovereign prince now laid claim to the all-seeing eye and the 
divine rays that illuminate the world.10 No doubt there is a shift in the use of such tropes. As 
Hans Belting points out (1997), the movement from pre-modern to modern is marked by the 
 
 
10 Examples discussed in Goodrich 2014 include emblems by Wither 1635, Bateman 1569, Presyler, and others. 
See also Zincgreff 1635, Bruck 1618, Sebastian de Covorrubius Orozco, 1613, Aneau 1565, all in Henkel & 
Schone 1967. 
                                                          
  
 
transformation of the function of images from icons whose meaning is simply present, like an 
aura, to artworks whose meaning requires (and is therefore subject to) interpretation. Reading 
becomes metaphorical and indirect rather than theological and direct. The image of the sun 
does not manifest what the sovereign ‘is’ but describes what he ‘is like’. Nonetheless these 
newly-reconstituted symbols were rendered immeasurably more powerful by the reflected light 
of their divine predecessors. Gilt by association. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 3: Frankfurt Calendar (woodcut, 1547) 
Originally reproduced in Erwin Panofksy, Meaning in the Visual Arts (Princeton 
University Press, 1948), fig. 84 between pp. 170-71. 
 
The afterlife of Sol Justiciae itself presents a perfect example of the efficacy of the 
constant signifier to metastasize in this way, and thus to document in visual form the work of 
time in law. The 1547 Frankfurt Calendar shows one of many sixteenth century copies of 
Dürer’s image.11 Its indebtedness to the original is obvious. Far more telling than the 
similarities between the two illustrations, however, are the differences. Fifty years after Dürer’s 
original, the sun of justice has metamorphosed into the sovereign – instead of a sword, a 
scepter; instead of scales of justice, an orb. Now the lion looks away and the sovereign meets 
our gaze. Indeed, the figure of sovereignty literally makes a spectacle of himself, his legs wide 
apart, his eyes directly engaged with ours. The naked cross-legged humility of the Sol has been 
replaced by an aggressively phallic arrogance. The sun too, or at least a star, has gravitated 
11 Panofsky 1995, p. 265 alludes to it in a footnote (n. 84), but does not appear to fully appreciate its implications. 
                                                          
  
 
from head to groin, from mind to will, and from a burdensome duty to a compelling desire. 
Solar power has turned from a righteous agent of the divine into a rightful possession of the 
State; the difference between righteous and rightful is the difference between a claim which 
depends on the quality of the act and a claim which depends on the identity of the actor. There 
is all the difference in the world – in ideology, rhetoric, and orientation – between a righteous 
king and a rightful king, between, say, Saint Louis or Louis the Pious or Louis the Just, and 
Louis XIV, the Sun King. The image discloses with remarkable clarity how quickly and in 
what ways Dürer’s figure had become a transitional myth whose citation evoked the past while 
inaugurating the future. Sovereignty appropriated and embodied the totalitarian potential of the 
discourse of sunlight, just as it seized the whole theological structure of the Middle Ages 
(Kantorowicz 1965, pp. 157 ff., 382 ff.; 1997).12 The Frankfurt Calendar transforms an image 
of the irresistible force of transcendent justice into an image of the irresistible force of 
immanent laws. 
Again, Sol Justiciae has undergone a double declension. Dürer’s original engraving 
legitimated medieval Christian ideas of legality by citation from the ancient Greeks. Later 
copies legitimated early modern ideas of sovereignty by citation from Christian iconography. 
We saw the same pattern in relation to the figure of blind justice. There too we noted two 
successive shifts in signification, first from a theological to a secular context, and then from a 
critique of separation to an ideology of it. Blind justice came to valorize modern ideas of 
legality by citation from Protestant critiques. In each case, the backward-looking gestures of 
the image offered rhetorical and psychological continuity, without arresting substantive or 
structural change. As transitional myths, they operated on two registers at once, transporting 
the discourse and the sensibility of one period, in the interests of another. In the case of both 
12 Perhaps it is worth noting that, after the Copernican revolution, the status and meaning of the sun itself had 
changed in important ways.   
                                                          
  
 
sets of images, the constant mythic signifier masked and justified radical changes in legal 
theory and social ordering. Just so, William Blackstone’s myth of the common law as 
proceeding from ‘immemorial usage’ (1830, Section 3) and filling legal space, at least 
according to Oliver Wendell Holmes’ characterization, like some ‘brooding omnipresence in 
the sky’ (Southern Pacific Co. 1917, p. 222), imparted a mythic continuity to legal practices 
that were, in point of fact, notable for their fluidity and adaptability. 
Winnicott helps you to appreciate how deeply embedded these symbolic and affective 
processes are in human life. But Barthes helps you to maintain your critical distance from them. 
The security blanket offers the child the talisman of an authority figure, allowing him or her to 
adapt to their absence, a new context, or even a new regime. If that sounds like it might be 
traumatic or illusory, it is because sometimes it is. The myths instantiated by legal images can 
be seen to do much the same things. They too reify talismans of authority in order to allow the 
legal system to accommodate their absence, a new context – even a new legal regime. If that 
sounds like it might be an ideological sleight of hand that is because sometimes it is. By tracing 
the metastases of legal images over time, we can observe with remarkable clarity, the seismic 
shifts of legal transitions. But these images do not merely document structural, conceptual, and 
emotional changes in social relationships to law. They also actively participate in them. The 
dynamic they establish between signifier and signified, continuity and transfiguration, are 
critical elements in how legal change takes place, then and now. By incorporating these 
perspectives, it is hoped that we can develop not just an algebra but a calculus of legal images 
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